

# A Mean-Field Game theoretical approach to crowd dynamics

University of Bristol

Thibault Bonnemain, 18th October 2023

[Based on works w/ D. Ullmo, T. Gobron, M. Butano, C. Appert-Rolland, I. Echeverria-Huarte A. Nicolas, A. Seguin]

[Hoogendoorn, Bovy (2004)]

(2)

[Hoogendoorn, Bovy (2004)]

• Strategic level: Where (and when) should I go? What should I do?

[Hoogendoorn, Bovy (2004)]

- Strategic level: Where (and when) should I go? What should I do?
- <u>Tactical level:</u> What route should I take? How should I schedule my activities?

- Strategic level: Where (and when) should I go? What should I do?
- <u>Tactical level</u>: What route should I take? How should I schedule my activities?
- Operational level: How do I interact with the environment locally, en route?

- Strategic level: Where (and when) should I go? What should I do?
- <u>Tactical level</u>: What route should I take? How should I schedule my activities?
- Operational level: How do I interact with the environment locally, en route?



- Strategic level: Where (and when) should I go? What should I do?
- <u>Tactical level</u>: What route should I take? How should I schedule my activities?
- Operational level: How do I interact with the environment locally, en route?



- Strategic level: Where (and when) should I go? What should I do?
- <u>Tactical level</u>: What route should I take? How should I schedule my activities?
- Operational level: How do I interact with the environment locally, en route?



- Strategic level: Where (and when) should I go? What should I do?
- <u>Tactical level</u>: What route should I take? How should I schedule my activities?
- Operational level: How do I interact with the environment locally, en route?





[Nicolas et al. (2019)]



Experiment

#### (Averaged) pedestrian density

1

1m

#### Velocity field





#### (Averaged) pedestrian density

1

#### Velocity field



Symmetric density profile

1m



Experiment

#### (Averaged) pedestrian density

1

#### Velocity field



Symmetric density profile  $\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ \text{Pedestrians Density (ped/m<sup>2</sup>)} \end{array}$ 

 $1 \mathrm{m}$ 

4

Transverse displacement

#### **Granular matter**

#### Based on [Seguin et al. (2009)]



#### Velocity field



# **Time To Collision models**

Based on [Echeverria-Huarte, Nicolas(2023)] and [Karamouzas et al. (2017)]



• "Mechanical" models (granular and social forces) drastically fail to reproduce the qualitative features of the experiment.

- "Mechanical" models (granular and social forces) drastically fail to reproduce the qualitative features of the experiment.
- More modern TTC models struggle to do so.

- "Mechanical" models (granular and social forces) drastically fail to reproduce the qualitative features of the experiment.
- More modern TTC models struggle to do so.
- Experimental results are quite intuitive.

- "Mechanical" models (granular and social forces) drastically fail to reproduce the qualitative features of the experiment.
- More modern TTC models struggle to do so.
- Experimental results are quite intuitive.

Change of paradigm

• Long-term anticipation  $\rightarrow$  Competitive optimisation  $\rightarrow$  Game theory

- "Mechanical" models (granular and social forces) drastically fail to reproduce the qualitative features of the experiment.
- More modern TTC models struggle to do so.
- Experimental results are quite intuitive.

Change of paradigm

- Long-term anticipation  $\rightarrow$  Competitive optimisation  $\rightarrow$  Game theory
- Dense crowd  $\rightarrow$  Many-body problem  $\rightarrow$  Mean-field

#### **Comparing the different approaches**

[Bonnemain et al. (2023)]



#### Another example in a non-controlled environment





<u>Def:</u> Mathematical framework to study strategic optimization.



<u>Def:</u> Mathematical framework to study strategic optimization.

Hawk-Dove H (¼; ¼) (1; 0) Paradigm D (0; 1) (½; ½)

#### **Mean Field Games**

• <u>Subdiscipline of Game Theory:</u> problems of optimization with interacting agents in the large N limit.

#### **Mean Field Games**

- <u>Subdiscipline of Game Theory:</u> problems of optimization with interacting agents in the large N limit.
- Relatively recent: seminal papers published in 2006.

[Lasry, Lions (2006)]

[Huang, Malhamé, Caines (2006)]

#### **Mean Field Games**

- <u>Subdiscipline of Game Theory:</u> problems of optimization with interacting agents in the large N limit.
- Relatively recent: seminal papers published in 2006.

[Lasry, Lions (2006)]

[Huang, Malhamé, Caines (2006)]

 <u>Wide litterature:</u> mathematics, engineering sciences, economics, sociology ... [Lachapelle, Wolfram (2011)] [Guéant et al. (2012)] [Gomes, Saude (2014)] [Laguzet, Turinici (2015)] [Achdou et al. (2016)] [Cardaliaguet , Lehalle (2017)] [Bremaud, Ullmo (2022)] [Bonnemain et al. (2023)]

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

• N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$ 

( 10)

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

- N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$
- state of agent  $i \longrightarrow$  real vector  $\mathbf{X}^i$  (position, capital, beliefs...)

$$m(\mathbf{x}, t) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{1}^{N} \delta(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{X}_{t}^{i})$$
 density of agents

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

10

- N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$
- state of agent  $i \longrightarrow$  real vector  $\mathbf{X}^i$  (position, capital, beliefs...)

$$m(\mathbf{x}, t) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{1}^{N} \delta(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{X}_{t}^{i})$$
 density of agents

• agent's dynamic

$$\mathrm{d}\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i \mathrm{d}t + \sigma \mathrm{d}\mathbf{w}_t^i$$

 $d\mathbf{w}_t^i \equiv$  white noise drift  $\mathbf{a}_t^i \equiv$  control parameter

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

10

- N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$
- state of agent  $i \longrightarrow$  real vector  $\mathbf{X}^i$  (position, capital, beliefs...)

$$m(\mathbf{x}, t) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{1}^{N} \delta(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{X}_{t}^{i})$$
 density of agents

• agent's dynamic

$$\mathrm{d}\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i \mathrm{d}t + \sigma \mathrm{d}\mathbf{w}_t^i$$

 $d\mathbf{w}_t^i \equiv$  white noise drift  $\mathbf{a}_t^i \equiv$  control parameter

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_{t}^{T} \left(\frac{\mu}{2} (\mathbf{a}_{s}^{i})^{2} - V[\boldsymbol{m}](\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i}, s)\right) \mathrm{d}s + c_{T}(\mathbf{X}_{T}^{i})\right]$$
running cost terminal cost

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

- N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$
- state of agent  $i \longrightarrow$  real vector  $\mathbf{X}^i$  (position, capital, beliefs...)

$$m(\mathbf{x}, t) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{1}^{N} \delta(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{X}_{t}^{i})$$
 density of agents

• agent's dynamic

$$\mathrm{d}\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i \mathrm{d}t + \sigma \mathrm{d}\mathbf{w}_t^i$$

 $d\mathbf{w}_t^i \equiv$  white noise drift  $\mathbf{a}_t^i \equiv$  control parameter

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_{t}^{T} \left(\frac{\mu}{2}(\mathbf{a}_{s}^{i})^{2} - V[\boldsymbol{m}](\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i},s)\right) \mathrm{d}s + c_{T}(\mathbf{X}_{T}^{i})\right]$$
running cost terminal cost

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

- N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$
- state of agent  $i \longrightarrow$  real vector  $\mathbf{X}^i$  (position, capital, beliefs...)

$$m(\mathbf{x}, t) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{1}^{N} \delta(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{X}_{t}^{i})$$
 density of agents

• agent's dynamic

$$\mathrm{d}\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i \mathrm{d}t + \sigma \mathrm{d}\mathbf{w}_t^i$$

 $d\mathbf{w}_t^i \equiv$  white noise drift  $\mathbf{a}_t^i \equiv$  control parameter

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_{t}^{T} \left(\frac{\mu}{2}(\mathbf{a}_{s}^{i})^{2} - V[\boldsymbol{m}](\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i},s)\right) \mathrm{d}s + c_{T}(\mathbf{X}_{T}^{i})\right]$$
running cost terminal cost

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

10

- N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$
- state of agent  $i \longrightarrow$  real vector  $\mathbf{X}^i$  (position, capital, beliefs...)

$$m(\mathbf{x}, t) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{1}^{N} \delta(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{X}_{t}^{i})$$
 density of agents

• agent's dynamic

$$\mathrm{d}\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i \mathrm{d}t + \sigma \mathrm{d}\mathbf{w}_t^i$$

 $d\mathbf{w}_t^i \equiv$  white noise drift  $\mathbf{a}_t^i \equiv$  control parameter

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_{t}^{T} \left(\frac{\mu}{2} (\mathbf{a}_{s}^{i})^{2} - V[\boldsymbol{m}](\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i}, s)\right) \mathrm{d}s + c_{T}(\mathbf{X}_{T}^{i})\right]$$
running cost terminal cost

[Guéant, Lasry, Lions (2011)]

- N agents  $i = 1, 2, \cdots, N$   $(N \gg 1)$
- state of agent  $i \longrightarrow$  real vector  $\mathbf{X}^i$  (position, capital, beliefs...)

$$m(\mathbf{x}, t) \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{1}^{N} \delta(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{X}_{t}^{i})$$
 density of agents

• agent's dynamic

$$\mathrm{d}\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i \mathrm{d}t + \sigma \mathrm{d}\mathbf{w}_t^i$$

 $d\mathbf{w}_t^i \equiv$  white noise drift  $\mathbf{a}_t^i \equiv$  control parameter

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_{t}^{T} \left(\frac{\mu}{2} (\mathbf{a}_{s}^{i})^{2} - g\boldsymbol{m}(\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i}, s) - U_{0}(\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i} - \mathbf{v}t)\right) \mathrm{d}s + c_{T}(\mathbf{X}_{T}^{i})\right]$$
  
running cost terminal cost = 0

# **Mean Field Games equations**

• Optimization: linear programming leads to a *(backward)* Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the value function  $u(\mathbf{x}, \overline{t})$ 

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t \boldsymbol{u} + \frac{1}{2\mu} \left( \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \boldsymbol{u} \right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} \boldsymbol{u} = V[\boldsymbol{m}](\boldsymbol{x}, t) \\ \boldsymbol{u}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{t} = \boldsymbol{T}) = c_T(\boldsymbol{x}) \end{cases} \tag{HJB}$$

#### **Mean Field Games equations**

• Optimization: linear programming leads to a *(backward)* Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the value function  $u(\mathbf{x}, \overline{t})$ 

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t \boldsymbol{u} + \frac{1}{2\mu} \left( \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \boldsymbol{u} \right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} \boldsymbol{u} = V[\boldsymbol{m}](\boldsymbol{x}, t) \\ \boldsymbol{u}(\boldsymbol{x}, t = T) = c_T(\boldsymbol{x}) \end{cases}$$
(HJB).

(Kolmogorov).

• Langevin dynamic  $d\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i dt + \sigma d\mathbf{w}_t^i$  leads to a <u>(forward)</u> diffusion equation for the density m(x, t)

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t m - \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \left[ m \frac{\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} u}{\mu} \right] - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} m = 0 \\ m(x, t=0) = m_0(x) \end{cases}$$

# **Mean Field Games equations**

• Optimization: linear programming leads to a (backward) Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the value function  $u(\mathbf{x}, \frac{t}{t})$ 

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t \boldsymbol{u} + \frac{1}{2\mu} \left( \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \boldsymbol{u} \right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} \boldsymbol{u} = V[\boldsymbol{m}](\boldsymbol{x}, t) \\ \boldsymbol{u}(\boldsymbol{x}, t = T) = c_T(\boldsymbol{x}) \end{cases}$$
(HJB).

• Langevin dynamic  $d\mathbf{X}_t^i = \mathbf{a}_t^i dt + \sigma d\mathbf{w}_t^i$  leads to a <u>(forward)</u> diffusion equation for the density m(x, t)

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t m - \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \left[ m \frac{\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} u}{\mu} \right] & \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} m = 0 \\ m(x, t=0) = m_0(x) \end{cases} \text{ (Kolmogorov)} . \end{cases}$$

**Mean Field Game =** coupling between a (collective) stochastic motion and an (individual) optimization problem through a mean field

Theorem:

[Cardaliaguet, Lasry, Lions, Poretta (2013)]

- V[m](x,t) has no explicit time dependence
- Long optimization time:  $T \to \infty$
- System is confined
- ... + other conditions ...

for 
$$0 \ll t \ll T$$
 
$$\begin{vmatrix} \boldsymbol{m}(\mathbf{x},t) \simeq \boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{x}) \\ \boldsymbol{u}(\mathbf{x},t) \simeq \boldsymbol{u}_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{x}) + \boldsymbol{\lambda}t \end{vmatrix}$$

Theorem:

[Cardaliaguet, Lasry, Lions, Poretta (2013)]

- V[m](x,t) has no explicit time dependence
- Long optimization time:  $T \to \infty$
- System is confined
- ... + other conditions ...

[ 12 ]

Theorem:

[Cardaliaquet, Lasry, Lions, Poretta (2013)]

- V[m](x,t) has no explicit time dependence
- Long optimization time:  $T \to \infty$
- System is confined
- $\dots$  + other conditions  $\dots$

$$\begin{bmatrix} Cardaliaguet, Lasry, Lions, Poretta (2013) \end{bmatrix}$$
has no explicit time dependence
imization time:  $T \to \infty$ 
is confined
er conditions ...
$$T \to \infty$$
for  $0 \ll t \ll T$ 

$$\begin{bmatrix} m(\mathbf{x}, t) \simeq m_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{x}) \\ u(\mathbf{x}, t) \simeq u_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{x}) + \lambda t \end{bmatrix}$$

 $(m_{\mathrm{e}}, u_{\mathrm{e}}, \lambda)$  such that

$$\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \left( \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} u_{\mathbf{e}} \right)^{2} + \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} u_{\mathbf{e}} = V[\boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}}](\mathbf{x})$$

$$\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \left( \boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}} (\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} u_{\boldsymbol{e}}) \right) - \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} \boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}} = 0$$

 $\mathbf{y} \equiv \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{v}t$ 

Theorem:

[Cardaliaquet, Lasry, Lions, Poretta (2013)]

- V[m](x,t) has no explicit time dependence
- Long optimization time:  $T \to \infty$
- System is confined
- $\dots$  + other conditions  $\dots$

$$[Cardaliaguet, Lasry, Lions, Poretta (2013)]$$
The no explicit time dependence integration time:  $T \to \infty$ 
ation time:  $T \to \infty$ 
affined
anditions ...
$$m(\mathbf{y}, t) \simeq m_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{y})$$

$$u(\mathbf{y}, t) \simeq u_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{y}) + \lambda t$$

 $(m_{\rm e}, u_{\rm e}, \lambda)$  such that  $\begin{cases} \lambda - \\ \end{pmatrix}$ 

$$\mathbf{v} \cdot \nabla_{\mathbf{y}} - \frac{1}{2\mu} \left( \nabla_{\mathbf{y}} u_{\mathbf{e}} \right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{y}} u_{\mathbf{e}} = V[\boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}}](\mathbf{x})$$
$$\nabla_{\mathbf{y}} (\boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}} (\nabla_{\mathbf{y}} u_{\mathbf{e}}) + \mathbf{v}) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{y}} \boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}} = 0$$

 $\mathbf{y} \equiv \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{v}t$ 

Theorem:

[Cardaliaguet, Lasry, Lions, Poretta (2013)]

- V[m](x,t) has no explicit time dependence
- Long optimization time:  $T \to \infty$

for

- System is confined
- $\dots$  + other conditions  $\dots$

explicit time dependence  
on time: 
$$T \to \infty$$
  
ed  
tions ...  
 $0 \ll t \ll T$ 

$$\begin{bmatrix}
m(\mathbf{y}, t) \simeq m_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{y}) \\
u(\mathbf{y}, t) \simeq u_{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{y}) + \lambda t
\end{bmatrix}$$
For this, relevants, the second s

 $\begin{cases} \boldsymbol{\lambda} - \mathbf{v} \cdot \nabla_{\mathbf{y}} - \frac{1}{2\mu} \left( \nabla_{\mathbf{y}} \boldsymbol{u}_{\mathbf{e}} \right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{y}} \boldsymbol{u}_{\mathbf{e}} = V[\boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}}](\mathbf{x}) \\ \nabla_{\mathbf{y}} (\boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}}(\nabla_{\mathbf{y}} \boldsymbol{u}_{\mathbf{e}}) + \mathbf{v}) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{y}} \boldsymbol{m}_{\mathbf{e}} = 0 \end{cases}$ 

$$(m_{\rm e}, u_{\rm e}, \lambda)$$
 such that  
=  $-gm_0$ 

#### <u>A simple example</u>



"Search party" toy model:  $V[m](x,t) = gm(x,t) + U_0(x)$ < 0  $\propto -x^2$  **[** 13 ]

#### **Non-linear Schrödinger representation**

[Bonnemain, Gobron, Ullmo Phys.Lett. A (2020) ; SciPost (2020) ; J. Math. Phys. (2021)]

Introduce two new variables  $\Phi(\mathbf{x}, t)$ ,  $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}, t)$  defined by:

 $u(\mathbf{x},t) = -\mu\sigma^2 \log \left(\Phi(\mathbf{x},t)\right)$   $m(\mathbf{x},t) = \Gamma(\mathbf{x},t)\Phi(\mathbf{x},t)$ 

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mu\sigma^{2}\partial_{t}\Gamma = \frac{\mu\sigma^{4}}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{x}}\Gamma + U_{0}(\mathbf{x})\Gamma + g\,m\Gamma \\ -\mu\sigma^{2}\partial_{t}\Phi = \frac{\mu\sigma^{4}}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{x}}\Phi + U_{0}(\mathbf{x})\Phi + g\,m\Phi \end{array} \right. \qquad m = \Gamma\Phi$$

#### **Non-linear Schrödinger representation**

[Bonnemain, Gobron, Ullmo Phys.Lett. A (2020) ; SciPost (2020) ; J. Math. Phys. (2021)]

Introduce two new variables  $\Phi(\mathbf{x}, t)$ ,  $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}, t)$  defined by:

 $u(\mathbf{x},t) = -\mu\sigma^2 \log \left(\Phi(\mathbf{x},t)\right)$   $m(\mathbf{x},t) = \Gamma(\mathbf{x},t)\Phi(\mathbf{x},t)$ 

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mu\sigma^{2}\partial_{t}\Gamma = \frac{\mu\sigma^{4}}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{x}}\Gamma + U_{0}(\mathbf{x})\Gamma + g\,m\Gamma \\ -\mu\sigma^{2}\partial_{t}\Phi = \frac{\mu\sigma^{4}}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{x}}\Phi + U_{0}(\mathbf{x})\Phi + g\,m\Phi \end{array} \right. \qquad m = \Gamma\Phi$$



$$i\hbar\partial_t\Psi = -\frac{\hbar^2}{2\mu}\Delta_{\mathbf{x}}\Psi + U_0(\mathbf{x})\Psi + g|\Psi|^2\Psi$$

Non-Linear Schrödinger

$$(\Psi, \Psi^*, \hbar) \rightarrow (\Phi, \Gamma, i\mu\sigma^2)$$

#### **Non-linear Schrödinger representation**

[Bonnemain, Gobron, Ullmo Phys.Lett. A (2020) ; SciPost (2020) ; J. Math. Phys. (2021)]

Introduce two new variables  $\Phi_{e}(\mathbf{x}, t)$ ,  $\Gamma_{e}(\mathbf{x}, t)$  defined by:

 $u_{\rm e}(\mathbf{x},t) = -\mu\sigma^2 \log\left(\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{x},t)\right) \qquad m_{\rm e}(\mathbf{x},t) = \Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{x},t)\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{x},t)$ 

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned} \lambda \Gamma_{\rm e} &= \frac{\mu \sigma^4}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} \Gamma_{\rm e} + U_0(\mathbf{x}) \Gamma_{\rm e} + g \, m_e \Gamma_{\rm e} \\ \lambda \Phi_{\rm e} &= \frac{\mu \sigma^4}{2} \Delta_{\mathbf{x}} \Phi_{\rm e} + U_0(\mathbf{x}) \Phi_{\rm e} + g \, m_{\rm e} \Phi_{\rm e} \end{aligned} \right.$$



Rubidium atoms (170 nK)

$$\lambda'\Psi = -\frac{\hbar^2}{2\mu}\Delta_{\mathbf{x}}\Psi + U_0(\mathbf{x})\Psi + g|\Psi|^2\Psi$$

Non-Linear Schrödinger

$$(\Psi, \Psi^*, \hbar) 
ightarrow (\Phi, \Gamma, i\mu\sigma^2)$$

[Ullmo, Swiecicki, Gobron (2019)]

• Operators: 
$$\hat{X} \equiv \mathbf{x}$$
,  $\hat{\Pi} \equiv \mu \sigma^2 \nabla_{\mathbf{x}}$ ,  $\hat{O} \equiv f(\hat{\Pi}, \hat{X})$ 

[Ullmo, Swiecicki, Gobron (2019)]

15

• Operators: 
$$\hat{X} \equiv \mathbf{x}$$
,  $\hat{\Pi} \equiv \mu \sigma^2 \nabla_{\mathbf{x}}$ ,  $\hat{O} \equiv f(\hat{\Pi}, \hat{X})$ 

• Average:  $\langle \hat{O} \rangle(t) \equiv \int d\mathbf{x} \ \Gamma(\mathbf{x}, t) \hat{O} \Phi(\mathbf{x}, t) , \qquad m = \Gamma \Phi$ 

e.g. 
$$\langle \hat{N} \rangle \equiv \int d\mathbf{x} \ m(\mathbf{x}, t) , \qquad \langle \hat{X} \rangle \equiv \int d\mathbf{x} \ m(\mathbf{x}, t) \mathbf{x}$$

[Ullmo, Swiecicki, Gobron (2019)]

• Operators: 
$$\hat{X} \equiv \mathbf{x}$$
,  $\hat{\Pi} \equiv \mu \sigma^2 \nabla_{\mathbf{x}}$ ,  $\hat{O} \equiv f(\hat{\Pi}, \hat{X})$ 

- Average:  $\langle \hat{O} \rangle(t) \equiv \int d\mathbf{x} \ \Gamma(\mathbf{x},t) \hat{O} \Phi(\mathbf{x},t) \ , \qquad m = \Gamma \Phi$
- Hamiltonian:  $\hat{H} \equiv -\left(\frac{\hat{\Pi}}{2\mu} + g\Phi\Gamma + U_0\right)$

$$\begin{cases} -\mu\sigma^2\partial_t\Gamma = \hat{H}\Gamma \\ +\mu\sigma^2\partial_t\Phi = \hat{H}\Phi \end{cases} \Rightarrow \quad \mu\sigma^2\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\langle\hat{O}\rangle = \langle\partial_t\hat{O}\rangle + \langle[\hat{O},\hat{H}]\rangle \end{cases}$$

[Ullmo, Swiecicki, Gobron (2019)]

• Operators: 
$$\hat{X} \equiv \mathbf{x}$$
,  $\hat{\Pi} \equiv \mu \sigma^2 \nabla_{\mathbf{x}}$ ,  $\hat{O} \equiv f(\hat{\Pi}, \hat{X})$ 

- Average:  $\langle \hat{O} \rangle(t) \equiv \int d\mathbf{x} \ \Gamma(\mathbf{x},t) \hat{O} \Phi(\mathbf{x},t) \ , \qquad m = \Gamma \Phi$
- Hamiltonian:  $\hat{H} \equiv -\left(\frac{\hat{\Pi}}{2\mu} + g\Phi\Gamma + U_0\right)$

$$\begin{cases} -\mu\sigma^2\partial_t\Gamma = \hat{H}\Gamma\\ +\mu\sigma^2\partial_t\Phi = \hat{H}\Phi \end{cases} \Rightarrow \quad \mu\sigma^2\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\langle\hat{O}\rangle = \langle\partial_t\hat{O}\rangle + \langle[\hat{O},\hat{H}]\rangle\end{cases}$$

e.g. 
$$\begin{cases} \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t} \langle \hat{X} \rangle = \frac{\langle \hat{\Pi} \rangle}{\mu} & \begin{cases} \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t} \Sigma^2 = \frac{1}{\mu} \left( \langle \hat{X}\hat{\Pi} + \hat{\Pi}\hat{X} \rangle - 2\langle \hat{\Pi} \rangle \langle \hat{X} \rangle \right) \equiv \frac{\Lambda}{\mu} \\ \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t} \langle \hat{\Pi} \rangle = \langle -\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} U_0(\hat{X}) \rangle & \begin{cases} \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t} \Sigma^2 = \frac{1}{\mu} \left( \langle \hat{X}\hat{\Pi} + \hat{\Pi}\hat{X} \rangle - 2\langle \hat{\Pi} \rangle \langle \hat{X} \rangle \right) \equiv \frac{\Lambda}{\mu} \\ \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t} \Lambda = -2\langle \hat{X}\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} U_0(\hat{X}) \rangle + 2\langle \hat{\Pi}^2 \rangle & \Sigma^2 \equiv \langle \hat{X}^2 \rangle - \langle \hat{X} \rangle^2 \end{cases}$$

• Quadratic MFG are variational systems

$$S[\Gamma, \Phi] \equiv \int_0^T \mathrm{d}t \int_{\mathbb{R}} \mathrm{d}\mathbf{x} \left[ \frac{\mu \sigma^2}{2} (\Gamma \partial_t \Phi - \Phi \partial_t \Gamma) - \frac{\mu \sigma^4}{2} \nabla \Gamma \nabla \Phi + \left[ U_0 + \frac{g}{2} \Gamma \Phi \right] \Gamma \Phi \right]$$

$$\left( 16 \right)$$

• Quadratic MFG are variational systems

$$S[\Gamma, \Phi] \equiv \int_0^T \mathrm{d}t \int_{\mathbb{R}} \mathrm{d}\mathbf{x} \left[ \frac{\mu \sigma^2}{2} (\Gamma \partial_t \Phi - \Phi \partial_t \Gamma) - \frac{\mu \sigma^4}{2} \nabla \Gamma \nabla \Phi + \left[ U_0 + \frac{g}{2} \Gamma \Phi \right] \Gamma \Phi \right]$$

• Noether theorem: Energy is conserved

$$E = \int_{\mathbb{R}} \mathrm{d}\mathbf{x} \left[ -\frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2} \nabla \Gamma . \nabla \Phi + \frac{g}{2} (\Gamma \Phi)^2 + U_0 \Gamma \Phi \right]$$



• Quadratic MFG are variational systems

$$S[\Gamma, \Phi] \equiv \int_0^T \mathrm{d}t \int_{\mathbb{R}} \mathrm{d}\mathbf{x} \left[ \frac{\mu \sigma^2}{2} (\Gamma \partial_t \Phi - \Phi \partial_t \Gamma) - \frac{\mu \sigma^4}{2} \nabla \Gamma \nabla \Phi + \left[ U_0 + \frac{g}{2} \Gamma \Phi \right] \Gamma \Phi \right]$$

• Noether theorem: Energy is conserved

$$E = \int_{\mathbb{R}} \mathrm{d}\mathbf{x} \left[ -\frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2} \nabla \Gamma . \nabla \Phi + \frac{g}{2} (\Gamma \Phi)^2 + U_0 \Gamma \Phi \right]$$
$$\underline{E}^{\mathrm{kin}} \qquad \underline{E}^{\mathrm{int}} \qquad \underline{E}^{\mathrm{po}}$$

• Quadratic MFG are variational systems

$$S[\Gamma, \Phi] \equiv \int_0^T \mathrm{d}t \int_{\mathbb{R}} \mathrm{d}\mathbf{x} \left[ \frac{\mu \sigma^2}{2} (\Gamma \partial_t \Phi - \Phi \partial_t \Gamma) - \frac{\mu \sigma^4}{2} \nabla \Gamma \nabla \Phi + \left[ U_0 + \frac{g}{2} \Gamma \Phi \right] \Gamma \Phi \right]$$

• Noether theorem: Energy is conserved





# Solitons and integrability in (1+1)D

- In (1+1)D, if  $U_0 = 0$ : NLS and MFG are integrable.
- Lax connection

$$\partial_t U - \partial_x V + [U, V] = 0$$
$$U = \kappa_\epsilon \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\lambda}{2} & \Phi \\ \Gamma & -\frac{\lambda}{2} \end{pmatrix} \quad , \qquad V = \kappa_\epsilon \begin{pmatrix} \kappa_\epsilon \Phi \Gamma & -\partial_x \Phi \\ \partial_x \Gamma & -\kappa_\epsilon \Phi \Gamma \end{pmatrix} - \lambda U$$

• Poisson bracket and infinite hierearchy of conservation laws

$$\{F,G\} = \int_{\mathbb{R}} \left( \frac{\delta F}{\delta \Gamma} \frac{\delta G}{\delta \Phi} - \frac{\delta F}{\delta \Phi} \frac{\delta G}{\delta \Gamma} \right) \mathrm{d}x \quad , \qquad \{Q_n, Q_m\} = 0$$

• Soliton solutions

$$\Psi(x,t) = 2b \operatorname{sech} \left[ 2b(x+4at-x_0) \right] e^{\pm 2\left[ax+2(a^2-b^2)t+\phi_0\right]}$$

#### **Back to our model of pedestrian dynamics**

#### **Numerical implementation**



**Propagation**:  $\begin{cases} -\mu\sigma^2\partial_t\Phi = \frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2}\Delta\Phi + (U_0 + gm^{\rm in})\Phi \\ +\mu\sigma^2\partial_t\Gamma = \frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2}\Delta\Gamma + (U_0 + gm^{\rm in})\Gamma \end{cases}$  $[\Phi(T, \cdot) = 1] \qquad [\Gamma(0, \cdot) = m_0(\cdot)/\Phi(0, \cdot)]$ Self consistent equation :  $m^{\text{out}}(\mathbf{x},t) \equiv \Gamma(\mathbf{x},t)\Phi(\mathbf{x},t) = m^{\text{in}}(\mathbf{x},t)$ 

#### **Back to our model of pedestrian dynamics**



#### **Ergodic vs time dependent**

NB : exact symmetry for ergodic case

$$\begin{cases} -gm_0\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) = \frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{y}}\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + \mathbf{v}\cdot\nabla_{\mathbf{y}}\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + U_0(\mathbf{y})\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + g\,m_e(\mathbf{y})\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) \\ -gm_0\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) = \frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{y}}\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) - \mathbf{v}\cdot\nabla_{\mathbf{y}}\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + U_0(\mathbf{y})\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + g\,m_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y})\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) \end{cases}$$

#### **Ergodic vs time dependent**

NB : exact symmetry for ergodic case

$$\begin{cases} -gm_0\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) = \frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{y}}\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + \mathbf{v}\cdot\nabla_{\mathbf{y}}\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + U_0(\mathbf{y})\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + g\,m_e(\mathbf{y})\Gamma_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) \\ -gm_0\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) = \frac{\mu\sigma^4}{2}\Delta_{\mathbf{y}}\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) - \mathbf{v}\cdot\nabla_{\mathbf{y}}\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + U_0(\mathbf{y})\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) + g\,m_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y})\Phi_{\rm e}(\mathbf{y}) \end{cases}$$



20

Intruder

- Radius: R
- Velocity: *v*

#### Intruder

#### Pedestrians

- Radius: *R*
- Velocity: *v*

- Healing length:  $\xi = \sqrt{|\mu\sigma^4/2gm_0|}$
- "Sound velocity":  $c_s = \sqrt{|gm_0/2\mu|}$

Intruder

#### Pedestrians

- Healing length:  $\xi = \sqrt{|\mu\sigma^4/2gm_0|}$
- Velocity: *v*

• Radius: *R* 

• "Sound velocity":  $c_s = \sqrt{|gm_0/2\mu|}$ 

20

Up to a scaling factor, solutions of the (ergodic) MFG equations depend only on  $\xi/R$  and  $c_s/v$ .

Up to a scaling factor, solutions of the (ergodic) MFG equations depend only on  $\xi/R$  and  $c_s/v$ .

5

Pedestrians Density (ped/m<sup>2</sup>)



#### **Comparison to experiment**







# lm/s

# Good qualitative agreement.

# Does better than the other models.

Cannot claim quantitative agreement.

#### **Not limited to obstacle avoidance**

#### [Bonnemain et al. PRE (2023)]



# **Discounted Mean-Field Games**

[Butano, Appert-Rolland, Ullmo (2023)]

23

• Add a discount factor

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_{t}^{T} \left(\frac{\mu}{2}(\mathbf{a}_{s}^{i})^{2} - g\boldsymbol{m}(\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i},s) - U_{0}(\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i} - \mathbf{v}t)\right) e^{\gamma(t-s)} \mathrm{d}s + c_{T}(\mathbf{X}_{T}^{i})e^{\gamma(t-T)}\right]$$

# **Discounted Mean-Field Games**

[Butano, Appert-Rolland, Ullmo (2023)]

• Add a discount factor

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\int_{t}^{T} \left(\frac{\mu}{2} (\mathbf{a}_{s}^{i})^{2} - g\boldsymbol{m}(\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i}, s) - U_{0}(\mathbf{X}_{s}^{i} - \mathbf{v}t)\right) e^{\gamma(t-s)} \mathrm{d}s + c_{T}(\mathbf{X}_{T}^{i}) e^{\gamma(t-T)}\right]$$



 $\bigcirc$ 

 $\sim$ 





 $\left| \right|$ 

# **Conclusions**

- MFG reproduce qualitatively well the intruder experiment.
- Even in its simplest form does better than models found in commercial softwares (at least in this configuration).

## **Conclusions**

- MFG reproduce qualitatively well the intruder experiment.
- Even in its simplest form does better than models found in commercial softwares (at least in this configuration).

#### But...

- We cannot yet pretend to quantitative accuracy.
- MFG will struggle to address features associated with the fact that pedestrians are discrete entities. Their rationality may also be an issue.

# **Conclusions**

- MFG reproduce qualitatively well the intruder experiment.
- Even in its simplest form does better than models found in commercial softwares (at least in this configuration).

#### But...

- We cannot yet pretend to quantitative accuracy.
- MFG will struggle to address features associated with the fact that pedestrians are discrete entities. Their rationality may also be an issue.

#### And thankfully...

- MFG is versatile.
- Room for improvement (e.g. congestion [Lachapelle, Wolfram (2011)], discount factor, more accurate interaction potential, feedback on the intruder...).

